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Abstract 
Cursing Kṛṣṇa: 
Gender, Theodicy, and Time in the Mahābhārata 
Jeff Wilson, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  Joel P. Brereton 
In this paper, I will discuss the doctrines of theodicy and time in the 
Mahābhārata, with particular attention to the concept of gender in the epic milieu.  I 
argue that the parallel narratives of Draupadī and Gāndhārī play a central role in 
establishing what Emily T. Hudson refers to as “the aesthetics of suffering.” Draupadī 
and Gāndhārī’s respective arguments against Kṛṣṇa, especially, raise a number of crucial 
theodicean questions that ultimately contribute to the overall argument of the text in 
regards to the necessity of detachment (vairāgya) and the ravages of Time (kāla).  As 
such, this paper endeavors to provide a reading of the text that contextualizes Draupadī 
and Gāndhārī’s theodicean arguments in terms of Kṛṣṇa’s identification with the epic’s 
concept of Time, the interplay of gender and ethics that inform these arguments, and 
finally, a possible answer to these arguments that incorporates the above insights.  In the 
end, I hope to provide a fitting testament to both the moral and theological depth of the 
epic as a whole. 
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 1 
Introduction: The Case Against Time 
In her book Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of Suffering in the 
Mahābhārata, Emily T. Hudson identifies kālavāda, or “the doctrine of time”1 as the 
central theme of the epic.  Where other scholars have variously described the 
Mahābhārata2 as “an argument with God,”3 a “harsh, bare, stark, and demanding 
philosophy of life,”4 and a testament to “the problem of existence itself,”5 Hudson’s own 
interpretation resonates more with David Shulman’s vision of the Mahābhārata “as an 
extended essay…on time and its terrors.”6  For Hudson, Time7 (kāla) in the Mahābhārata 
is not only an abstract concept, but also a personified “character”8 that serves as the 
unsung antagonist of the epic, opposing both hero and villain alike. 
As a concept, Time, which is used interchangeably with Fate (daiva),9 can be 
described as “an oppressive, overpowering force that leads all living beings toward their 
                                                 
1 Emily T. Hudson, Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of Suffering in the Mahābhārata, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 156. 
2 Hereafter abbreviated in the footnotes as Mbh.  For the purposes of this paper, I shall rely primarily the 
translations of van Buitenen (books 1-6), Johnson (book 10), Fitzgerald (book 11), and Ganguli (books 7-9, 
12-18).  All translations featured in this paper are theirs unless otherwise noted.  However, this reliance will 
be coupled with frequent references to the diction of the original Sanskrit—particularly in the case of 
Ganguli’s rather dated translation. 
3 Alf Hiltebeitel,  ethin ing the Mahābhārata: A  eader s  uide to the Education of the  harma  ing, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 214. 
4 Irawati Karve, quoted in Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 215. 
5 V. S. Sukthankar, quoted in Arti Dhand, oman as  ire  oman as Sage: Se ua   deo og  in the 
Mahābhārata, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 12. 
6 David Shulman, quoted in Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 146. 
7 For the purposes of this paper, I have capitalized “Time” in the style of van Buitenen as a means of 
highlighting this specific concept of epic Time (kāla), as opposed to a more generic, universalized 
conception of “time.”  I have done the same with other terms such as Law (dharma) and Fate (daiva) for 
similar reasons. 
8 Ibid, 146-147. 
9 Ibid, 186. 
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doom.”10  In its abstract form as kālavāda, this concept of time serves as the impetus by 
which the dharma declines from one age (yuga) to the next, before the final age, known 
as the Kali Yuga, culminates in the destruction of the universe.  This destruction also 
entails rebirth of the universe and a return to the idyllic Kṛta Yuga, in which the dharma 
naturally begins to decline again with the progression of Time, ad infinitum.  As a 
cyclical phenomenon, epic Time is imagined as an ever-turning wheel, continually 
“revolving”11 (paryaya) through the four ages (yugas) and crushing every living being in 
its path with the strength of a juggernaut. 
As an entity, Time appears in the text as a multifarious “specter”12 that can appear 
allegorically as “a rat gnawing on a rope”13 or “a snake coiled at the bottom of a pit,”14 
but also in more humanoid forms, such as the goddess Kālarātrī15 in the Sauptika Parvan, 
the bald vagrant in the Mausala Parvan,16 and the hunter Jarā.17  The most provocative18 
of these personified forms is Kṛṣṇa, who refers to himself in the Bhagavad Gītā as the 
“Placer” (dhātṛ) or cosmic agent of Fate.19  This title occurs in the midst of Kṛṣṇa’s 
lengthy self-revelation to Arjuna, in which Arjuna experiences a vision of Kṛṣṇa’s 
                                                 
10 Luis Gonzalez-Reimann quoted in Ibid, 156. 
11 Ibid, 156. 
12 Ibid, 146-147.   
13 Ibid. See Mbh 1.13 and 1.41. 
14 Ibid. See Mbh 11.2-8. 
15 “The Night of Time.” Ibid. See Mbh 10.64-65.   
16 Ibid. See Mbh 16.3. 
17 Not mentioned by Hudson.  His name means “old age.” Mbh 16.5. 
18 Though inexplicably ignored by Hudson, who only addresses Kṛṣṇa in his capacity as an avatāra. See 
Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 198-205.   
19 Mbh 6.32.33-34. 
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“universal form” (viśvarūpa)20 with its myriad, monstrous mouths devouring both friend 
and foe like the fires of doomsday.21  He then famously22 proclaims to Arjuna: 
kālo 'smi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛddho; lokān samāhartum iha pravṛttaḥ। 
ṛte 'pi tvā na bhaviṣyanti sarve; ye 'vasthitāḥ pratyanīkeṣu yodhāḥ॥ 
[…]mayaivaite nihatāḥ pūrvam eva; nimittamātraṃ bhava Savyasācin॥ 
 
I am Time grown old to destroy the world, 
Embarked on the course of world annihilation: 
Except for yourself none of these will survive 
Of these warriors arrayed in opposite armies. 
…I myself have doomed them ages ago: 
Be merely my hand in this, Left-handed Archer!23 
 
It is at this point in the epic that the perennial threat of Time manifests itself in its full, 
apocalyptic glory as not only the destroyer of all life, but also the destroyer of all 
meaning insofar as it relates to human agency.  When Kṛṣṇa reveals his true nature to 
Arjuna, he also reveals the true extent to which humans remain totally powerless and 
utterly dominated by the whims of Time and Fate. 
                                                 
20 Mbh 6.33.16. 
21 Mbh 6.33.25-30. 
22 To be sure, the iconic nature of Kṛṣṇa’s self-revelation as Time in this passage is difficult to overstate, 
but it is not by any means the only cosmological description of Time in the text.  Nevertheless, it is in the 
spirit of A. K. Ramanujan—who declared that in the mind of a “native speaker,” the Mahābhārata 
represents a single “well-formed whole”—that I have opted to take the epic seriously as a unified text, 
rather than as an “unstructured monster” riddled with “hundreds of interpolations” (A. K. Ramanujan, 
“Repetition in the Mahābhārata,” in Essa s on the Mahābhārata  ed. Arvind Sharma, [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1991], 421).  Such a reading naturally places a great deal of weight on Kṛṣṇa’s claims in the Bhagavad 
Gītā.  For more information on the diverse threads of epic eschatology, theories of Time, and theodicy 
(respectively) that run through the Mahābhārata, see Lynn Thomas, “The Identity of the Destroyer in the 
Mahābhārata,” Numen 41, no. 3 (1994): 255-272; Alf Hiltebeitel and Randy Kloetzli, “Kāla,” in The 
Hindu World, ed. Sushil Mittal and Gene R. Thursby, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 553-586; and Wendy 
Doniger O’Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976), passim. 
23 Mbh 6.33.30-35. 
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 Indeed, the characters of the epic are constantly said to be “caught in ‘time’s 
noose’…‘bewildered’ and ‘impelled by the law of time.’”24  The trope of Time as the 
destroyer colors all major events of the epic accordingly, especially those involving death 
and grief.  When Aśvatthāman prepares for the massacre at night, for example, he senses 
a “reversal of Time,”25 and when Gāndhārī publically laments for her sons and their 
compatriots killed in the battle of Kurukṣetra, she cries out, “See how Time turns!”26 
 It is unsurprising then that as the single, pivotal “moment to which all other 
subsequent moments in the epic are a response,” the Mahābhārata’s account of the 
disrobing of Draupadī also includes a number of perspectives on Time.  This begins when 
Duryodhana sends an usher to fetch Draupadī from the women’s quarters and the 
princess responds with equanimity by reciting the following verse: 
evaṃ nūnaṃ vyadadhāt Saṃvidhātā; sparśāv ubhau spṛśato vīra bālau। 
dharmaṃ tv ekaṃ paramaṃ prāha loke; sa naḥ śamaṃ dhāsyati 
gopyamānaḥ॥ 
 
That is how he disposes, the All-Disposer, 
Both touches touch the sage and the fool: 
He said, “In this world only Law is supreme”: 
He shall bring us peace when the Law is obeyed!27 
 
At this point, Draupadī, having secluded herself in the midst of her period, has absolutely 
no intention of entering the assembly hall and polluting it with her ritually impure 
                                                 
24 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 156. 
25 Mbh 10.1.64, quoted in Alf Hiltebeitel, The Ritual of Battle: Krishna in the Mahābhārata, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), 317. 
26 Mbh 11.25.25-35. 
27 Mbh 2.60.13. 
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presence.  Governed as she is by “the Law of women,”28 Draupadī has no intention 
whatsoever of complying with the usher’s—that is to say Duryodhana’s—inappropriate 
demands.  Moreover, this verse leads us to believe that Draupadī, whose behavior falls 
firmly on the side of “Law” (that is to say dharma)29, will prevail in this dispute because 
those who follow the Law are understood to be favored by the workings of Fate, here 
personified as “the All-Disposer” (saṃvidhātṛ). 
 Unfortunately, this does not prove to be the case, as Draupadī is eventually 
dragged to the hall by the hair and molested in full view of her husbands and the elders of 
the Kuru dynasty.  In the midst of her humiliation, she publically laments, 
mṛṣyante Kuravaś ceme manye kālasya paryayam। 
snuṣāṃ duhitaraṃ caiva kliśyamānām anarhatīm॥ 
kiṃ tv ataḥ kṛpaṇaṃ bhūyo yad ahaṃ strī satī śubhā। 
sabhāmadhyaṃ vigāhe 'dya kva nu dharmo mahīkṣitām॥ 
 
The Kurus allow—and methinks Time is out of joint—their innocent daughter 
and daughter-in-law to be molested!  What greater humiliation than that I, a 
woman of virtue and beauty, now must invade the men’s hall?  What is left of the 
Law of the kings?30 
 
While one would perhaps expect any other woman in the same position to do the same 
thing, Draupadī’s speech also carries with it a broader, cosmic concern.  By juxtaposing 
the seeming impotence of “the Law of kings” with the treachery of Time, Draupadī casts 
doubt on her previous assertion that the All-Disposer rewards those who follow the Law.  
                                                 
28 Mbh 2.72.10-20 
29 For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the abstract concept as either Law or dharma, as opposed to 
Dharma as the god who represents this concept.  Granted, the distinction between the concept and the god 
does not exist in the text, but such a level of fluidity is difficult to render into English in a readable fashion. 
30 Mbh 2.62.7-8. 
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Like Kṛṣṇa’s self-revelation to Arjuna, the ethico-cosmic implications of the disrobing 
scene create what Hudson describes as a “rupture”: a “gap in meaning”31 so vast that it 
threatens to devour the integrity of the text and, by extension, the moral universe itself.  
In this way, Draupadī’s faith in the workings of Fate is fast eclipsed by terror and dread 
in the face of Time. 
 Draupadī’s doubts are later echoed by Dhṛtarāṣṭra who, in a rare moment of 
lucidity, bemoans his own circumstance as a victim of omnipotent, omnimalevolent Fate. 
As Draupadī and the Pāṇḍavas leave the assembly hall, he tells Saṃjaya, 
yasmai devāḥ prayacchanti puruṣāya parābhavam। 
buddhiṃ tasyāpakarṣanti so 'pācīnāni paśyati॥ 
buddhau kaluṣa bhūtāyāṃ vināśe pratyupasthite। 
anayo nayasaṃkāśo hṛdayān nāpasarpati॥ 
anarthāś cārtharūpeṇa arthāś cānartha rūpiṇaḥ। 
uttiṣṭhanti vināśānte naraṃ tac cāsya rocate॥ 
na kālo daṇḍam udyamya śiro kṛntati kasya cit। 
kālasya balam etāvad viparītārtha darśanam॥ 
 
When the Gods deal defeat to a person, they first take his mind away, so that he 
sees matters wrongly. When destruction is imminent and his mind is beclouded, 
the wrong course appears as the right one and cannot be dislodged from his heart.  
When his destruction is near, evil takes on the appearance of good, the good 
appears as evil, and thus they rise up before a man and he is content.  Time does 
not raise a stick and clobber a man’s head; the power of Time is just this upended 
view of things.32 
Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s speech raises what is arguably the central question of Mahābhārata, 
namely: the question of why good people, good kingdoms, and good lives go bad and 
what kinds of forces are responsible for this process.  Where Draupadī merely suspects 
                                                 
31 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 102. 
32 Mbh 2.72.8-11. 
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that Time is “out of joint” (paryaya),33 Dhṛtarāṣṭra finds his answer in personifying Time 
as an omnipresent, subtle but nonetheless vicious mortal enemy of humankind.  However, 
the true horror implied by the epic concept of Time is not its propensity for physical 
destruction, or even “the Gods” complicity in this destruction, but rather Time’s active 
role in the decay of human morality.  As the hidden agent behind the misdeeds and 
delusions of humankind, Time’s ubiquitous presence in the text represents a rupture at the 
very heart of the epic’s worldview, because it implies that the actions of its characters are 
not truly their own. 
 His discussion of Time notwithstanding, the most intriguing moment of 
Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s melodramatic monologue occurs when, in the midst of a poetic description 
of Draupadī, he says “Earth herself would burn under her [i.e. Draupadī’s] wretched 
eyes.”34  Despite its seeming offhandedness, Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s comment is suffused with 
deeper meaning, because it recalls at once the story of “the burden of the Earth”35 
mentioned in the Ādi Parvan as well as the later scene in which Gāndhārī scorches 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s fingernails with the ascetic power channeled through her eyes.36   
The connection between Draupadī and Gāndhārī is then reinforced in the 
following verse, which focuses on the lament of Gāndhārī and the other Bhārata women, 
who mourn the departure of Draupadī and what that means for the future of the kingdom.  
                                                 
33 The exact same phrase—man e  ā as a par a am—that van Buitenen translates as “methinks Time is 
out of joint” (Mbh 2.62.7).  A more accurate rendering of this phrase occurs in The Ritual of Batttle, where 
Hiltebeitel translates it as “I regard this as a reversal of Time” (Mbh 10.1.64, quoted in Hiltebeitel, The 
Ritual of Battle, 317).  Paryaya is the same word that Hudson renders as “revolving” when she describes 
Time as a wheel.  See Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 156. 
34 Mbh 2.72.18. 
35 Mbh 1.58.40-50. 
36 Mbh 11.15. 
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Like the twin instances of clothing-related supernatural activity—that is to say, 
Draupadī’s never-ending sari37 and the aforementioned heat from the edge of Gāndhārī’s 
blindfold—Gāndhārī’s commiseration with Draupadī in the Sabhā Parvan finds its 
parallel nine books later, when Gāndhārī and Draupadī together mourn the loss of their 
sons,38 but these are just a few of the many similarities shared by these two characters.  
Both are wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and queens incarnated from the realm of 
gods.39  They are both closely-associated with dharma and so devoted to their husbands 
that they voluntarily handicap themselves so as not to be above them.40  Draupadī and 
Gāndhārī both receive boons that increase the size of their family,41 they have strong 
opinions about the nature of kingship42 (which naturally go unheeded), and both of them 
lose their sons as an indirect result of their brothers’ scheming.43  Likewise, they both 
experience life-changing encounters with fire.44 
 Perhaps the most interesting connection between the two women is that both of 
them at various points blame both Time/Fate and Kṛṣṇa for the carnage of the Bhārata 
war.45  Likewise, when Dhṛtarāṣṭra tacitly links the two women to the Earth with the 
                                                 
37 Mbh 2.61.40-45. 
38 Mbh 11.15.16b-20. 
39 Mbh 1.61.95-100. 
40 As in the case of Draupadī’s voluntary exile and Gāndhārī’s blindfold. 
41 Gāndhārī’s boon of a hundred sons and Draupadī’s five husbands, respectively. 
42 See Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s parallel discussions to Yudhiṣṭhira and Duryodhana on the nature of 
kingship in the Vana and Udyoga Parvans (respectively). 
43 Specifically, Śakuni and Dhṛṣṭadyumna, who are both indirectly responsible for the deaths of their 
nephews. 
44 As in the case of Draupadī’s birth and Gāndhārī’s death. 
45 As discussed in the following section.  See Mbh 3.13, 3.31, and 11.25. 
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phrase, “Earth herself would burn under her wretched eyes,”46 it must be noted that all 
three female agents share an intimate connection with Kṛṣṇa, as the Earth occasions the 
incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, Draupadī sets in motion his purpose on Earth, and Gāndhārī puts an 
end to it with her curse.  This apparent coincidence merits further investigation. 
 To be sure, Hudson herself considers the unique character of Kṛṣṇa to be a dead 
end or “non-answer”47 when it comes to the question of theodicy, but Hudson’s analysis 
also, inexplicably, refuses to acknowledge Kṛṣṇa as Time—thereby ignoring a crucial 
component in the “narrative strategy” she terms “the aesthetics of suffering.”48  For 
example, when Hudson describes how these aesthetics present Time as “a ‘solution’ to 
the problem of suffering”49 as well as its cause, this supposed solution entails “an 
enlightened acceptance and acknowledgement of time’s power,”50 “equanimity,”51 and “a 
calm, disinterested mind”52 that then allows one to “psychologically move beyond 
time…and hence beyond suffering.”53  While this is certainly an accurate portrayal of the 
epic’s thought, Hudson fails to note that it corresponds perfectly to the teachings of the 
Bhagavad Gītā, as delivered by Kṛṣṇa,54 who reveals himself as Time shortly thereafter.55   
                                                 
46 Mbh 2.72.18. 
47 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 205-206. 
48 Ibid, 176. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, 177. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, 176. 
54 See Mbh 6.24, for example. 
55 Ibid, 177. 
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In a similar fashion, Hudson describes how the epic discourages “emotional 
responses (such as grief and anger) to the injustices”56 of Time in favor of vairāgya, a 
value she defines as “the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off 
of desire.”57  However, in doing so, she effectively ignores Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s 
responses and focuses instead on Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Yudhishthira who, despite their 
incessant philosophizing, never presume to take Kṛṣṇa to task in his capacity as Time. 
 Thus, in light of the evidence produced by Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s parallel 
arguments against Kṛṣṇa as Time, this paper will attempt to provide a reading of the 
Mahābhārata—that is to say, a single interpretation, coherent in itself, but also one of 
many possibilities—that reexamines the place of these two queens within the theodicean 
milieu of the text and its aesthetics of suffering.  I argue that these parallel arguments 
play a central role in establishing the aesthetics of suffering, posing crucial questions of 
theodicy, and finally, pointing towards a suitable conclusion of the text as an argument 
against grief. As such, the remainder of the paper will consist of three main parts as I 
describe 1) the three arguments against Kṛṣṇa presented by Draupadī, Gāndhārī, and the 
sage Uttanka, along with their various rebuttals; 2) the connection between gender, 
ethics, and Time in the Mahābhārata, with special attention to the decline of dharma and 
the symbolic roles occupied by Draupadī and Gāndhārī as both women and queens; and 
finally, 3) the manner in which Kṛṣṇa’s own example within the text implies the value of 
vairāgya as the ‘answer’ to these arguments. 
                                                 
56 Ibid, 56. 
57 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 56. 
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Three Arguments with God: The Prosecution of a Devious Divinity 
The doctrine of kālavāda and the theodicean problems it implies dominate 
Draupadī’s and Gāndhārī’s arguments against Kṛṣṇa.  While there is certainly no dearth 
of arguments against Kṛṣṇa himself in the text,58 only Draupadī, Gāndhārī, and Uttanka 
seem to take Kṛṣṇa’s divine nature into account.  To be sure, Uttanka’s appearance in the 
Aśvamedhika Parvan seems more or less like an afterthought, but Kṛṣṇa’s response to his 
argument provides a valuable insight into his two previous discussions with Draupadī and 
Gāndhārī.  It is only in the final argument with Uttanka that Kṛṣṇa openly refers to his 
own divinity, but taken together as a whole, the three arguments build up to this moment, 
as the suggestions of Kṛṣṇa’s affinity with Time become more and more prominent.  
DRAUPADĪ’S ARGUMENT 
As Kṛṣṇa’s first major interlocutor, Draupadī’s criticism of Kṛṣṇa and Time is 
split between two parallel dialogues, one regarding Kṛṣṇa himself and the other, 
regarding him in the abstract as the Placer (dhātṛ).   Both of these dialogues take place 
early on in the epic and as such, the connection is mentioned offhand, but not 
emphasized.  All the evidence is there, but for some reason, Draupadī does not seem to 
put two and two together. 
The first dialogue occurs in chapter thirteen of the Vana Parvan, in which the 
Pāṇḍavas, fresh from their banishment at the hands of the villainous Kauravas, are visited 
by their friend Kṛṣṇa.  Before Draupadī’s conversation with Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna greets him in 
                                                 
58 Such as that of Duryodhana.  See Mbh 9.60. 
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pious terms, referring to him variously as Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Rudra, Brahma, Yama, the 
Law, the Placer, and, most notably, “Time.”59  He then praises Kṛṣṇa, saying:  
yugānte sarvabhūtāni saṃkṣipya Madhusūdana। 
ātmany evātma sātkṛtvā jagad āsse paraṃtapa॥ 
 
At the end of the Eon you dissolve all creatures, Madhusūdana, and having made 
the world your own within your very self, you remain thereafter, enemy-burner.60 
 
Here, in anticipation of Mārkaṇḍeya’s lecture, Arjuna summarizes the theology of 
Kṛṣṇa’s cosmic supremacy and his association with both Time and Fate. 
Meanwhile, Draupadī is present at this very same assembly, and she also prefaces 
her address to Kṛṣṇa in theological terms, referring to him as Prajāpati, Viṣṇu, the 
“Supreme Person” (puruṣottama), and “the truth” (satyam).61 Having affirmed her faith 
in Kṛṣṇa, Draupadī comes to the main body in her argument with an explosion of 
indignation: 
nanv ahaṃ Kṛṣṇā Bhīṣmasya Dhṛtarāṣṭrasya cobhayoḥ। 
snuṣā bhavāmi dharmeṇa sāhaṃ dāsī kṛtā balāt॥ 
garhaye Pāṇḍavāṃs tv eva yudhi śreṣṭhān mahābalān। 
ye kliśyamānāṃ prekṣante dharmapatnīṃ yaśasvinīm॥ 
 
Am I not Kṛṣṇā, by Law the daughter-in-law of Bhīṣma and Dhṛtarāṣṭra? And I 
was forcibly reduced to a slave! I detest the Pāṇḍavas, those grand strongmen in 
war, who looked on while their glorious consort in Law was molested!62 
 
Here, Draupadī invokes the principle of rakṣaṇa to highlight the failure of her husbands, 
their relatives, and their allies to protect her.  Her emphatic use of the term “consort in 
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Law” (dharmapatnī) emphasizes the moral dimension of her plight because, as was 
established in the second book, the assault in the assembly hall was not merely an assault 
on Draupadī but an assault on the dharma itself.  Thus, Draupadī understands the 
problem to be not just a matter of realpolitik, but a matter of cosmic morality as well.  
Bracketing her own nature as Śrī and its marital implications, it is for this reason that 
Draupadī approaches Kṛṣṇa in both capacities, as both her husbands’ ally and the 
Supreme Being.  
 Upon hearing this, Kṛṣṇa replies, 
rodiṣyanti striyo hy evaṃ yeṣāṃ kruddhāsi bhāmini॥ 
bībhatsu śarasāṃchannāñ śoṇitaughapariplutān। 
nihatāñ jīvitaṃ tyaktvā śayānān vasudhātale॥ 
yat samarthaṃ pāṇḍavānāṃ tat kariṣyāmi mā śucaḥ। 
satyaṃ te pratijānāmi rājñāṃ rājñī bhaviṣyasi॥ 
pated dyaur himavāñ śīryet pṛthivī śakalībhavet। 
śuṣyet toyanidhiḥ Kṛṣṇe na me moghaṃ vaco bhavet॥ 
 
Weep shall the women of those that have angered you, angry woman!  Weep over 
their men as they lie on the face of the earth, covered by the Terrifier’s [i.e. 
Arjuna’s] arrows, showered by a rain of blood, cut down to relinquish their lives!  
I shall do whatever the Pāṇḍavas can do; do not sorrow!  I make you a promise: 
you shall be a queen of kings!  Let Sky fall down, let Himalaya break, let Earth 
splinter, let Sea dry up, Kṛṣṇā—my word shall not be false!63 
 
Just as Draupadī addresses Kṛṣṇa in both personal and cosmic terms, Kṛṣṇa answers in 
kind by assuring her that his promise of the Pāṇḍavas’ victory is destined to occur.  
Indeed, Kṛṣṇa’s reply is pregnant with theological import, because the apocalyptic 
imagery Kṛṣṇa invokes is not merely a figure of speech, but as will later be seen in the 
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vision of Mārkaṇḍeya, it is a distant but nonetheless impending reality.  In the end, 
Kṛṣṇa’s word proves itself true, but it is also important to note that rather than truly 
addressing the injustice at the heart of Draupadī’s grievances, Kṛṣṇa merely offers a 
deferral that maintains the brutal status quo of the epic, while simultaneously preserving 
dubious position as a caring friend and ally. 
 Eighteen chapters later, Draupadī has a similar outburst in conversation with 
Yudhiṣṭhira, in which she condemns Fate as in his capacity as the “Lord Placer” (dhātṛ 
īśāna).  This speech provides an implicit parallel to the one in chapter thirteen, in that 
where she had previously complained to Kṛṣṇa about her impotent husbands, here, she 
complains to her eldest husband about the cosmic cruelty of Fate.  Most of her discussion 
centers on Fate as anthropomorphized force and all the existential horror such a concept 
entails, as she describes how people are “like wooden puppets” (iva dārumayī yoṣā)64 
whose lives are predestined before they are even born. 
ārya karmaṇi yuñjānaḥ pāpe vā punar īśvaraḥ। 
vyāpya bhūtāni carate na cāyam iti lakṣyate॥ 
[…]yathā kāṣṭhena vā kāṣṭam aśmānaṃ cāśmanā punaḥ। 
ayasā cāpy ayaś chindyān nirviceṣṭam acetanam॥ 
evaṃ sa Bhagavān devaḥ svayambhūḥ prapitāmahaḥ। 
hinasti bhūtair bhūtāni chadma kṛtvā Yudhiṣṭhira॥ 
saṃprayojya viyojyāyaṃ kāmakāra karaḥ prabhuḥ। 
krīḍate Bhagavan bhūtair bālaḥ krīḍanakair iva॥ 
na mātṛpitṛvad rājan dhātā bhūteṣu vartate। 
roṣād iva pravṛtto 'yaṃ yathāyam itaro janaḥ॥ 
āryāñ śīlavato dṛṣṭvā hrīmato vṛtti karśitān। 
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anāryān sukhinaś caiva vihvalāmīva cintayā॥ 
tavemām āpadaṃ dṛṣṭvā samṛddhiṃ ca Suyodhana। 
dhātāraṃ garhaye Pārtha viṣamaṃ yo 'nupaśyati॥ 
ārya śāstrātige krūre lubdhe dharmāpacāyini। 
Dhārtarāṣṭre śriyaṃ dattvā dhātā kiṃ phalam aśnute॥ 
karma cet kṛtam anveti kartāraṃ nānyam ṛcchati। 
karmaṇā tena pāpena lipyate nūnam Īśvaraḥ॥ 
atha karmakṛtaṃ pāpaṃ na cet kartāram ṛcchati। 
kāraṇaṃ balam eveha janāñ śocāmi durbalān॥ 
 
Yoking himself to deeds noble and evil, God roams through the creatures and is 
not identified….As one breaks wood with wood, stone with stone, iron with iron, 
the inert with the insentient, so the blessed God, the self-existent great-
grandfather, hurts creatures with creatures, hiding behind a disguise, Yudhiṣṭhira.  
Joining and unjoining them, the capricious blessed Lord plays with the creatures 
like a child with its toys.  The Placer does not act toward his creatures like a father 
or mother, he seems to act out of fury, like every other person!  When I see noble, 
moral, and modest people harassed in their way of life, and the ignoble happy, I 
seem to stagger with wonder.  Having witnessed your distress and the wealth at 
Suyodhana’s, I condemn the Placer, Pārtha, who allows such outrages! What does 
the Placer gain by giving the fortune to the Dhārtarāṣṭra who offends against the 
noble scriptures, a cruel, avaricious diminisher of the Law?  If an act that has been 
done pursues its doer and no one else, then surely God is tainted by the evil he has 
done!  Or if the evil that has been done does not pursue its doer, then mere power 
is the cause of everything, and I bemoan powerless folk!65 
 
Where Draupadi had previously expressed her faith in the justice of the “All-Disposer,”66 
her depiction of Fate in this passage deludes and impels all beings to good and evil action 
alike, slaughtering “creatures with creatures.”  In her discussion, Fate is personified as 
“blessed God, the self-existent great-grandfather,” who nonetheless possesses neither pity 
nor restraint, but only capriciousness and unrelenting cruelty as he “plays with the 
creatures like a child with its toys.”   
                                                 
65 Mbh 3.31.29, 34-42, emphasis mine. 
66 Mbh 2.60.13. 
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These horrific images notwithstanding, the most horrific notion of all is that this 
inhuman, ethically monstrous conception of Fate roams freely among humankind, 
unidentified.  In a more literal sense, this occurs in the Mausala Parvan where Time 
himself appears in the form of a mysterious vagrant,67 but of course, the most intimate 
instance of this phenomenon is that of Kṛṣṇa himself, as described in chapter thirteen.  
Even though Kṛṣṇa himself is not mentioned in this passage, a broader reading of the epic 
as a whole encourages us to view this too as a challenge of his ethical authority. 
 At first, Yudhiṣṭhira replies in a characteristically obtuse manner, by describing 
her speech as “well-phrased and polished,” but still “heresy” (nāstikya).68  He then 
elaborates on this point with an argument of his own: 
nāhaṃ dharmaphalānveṣī rājaputri carāmy uta। 
dadāmi deyam ity eva yaje yaṣṭavyam ity uta॥ 
astu vātra phalaṃ mā vā kartavyaṃ puruṣeṇa yat। 
gṛhān āvasatā Kṛṣṇe yathāśakti karomi tat॥ 
dharmaṃ carāmi suśroṇi na dharmaphalakāraṇāt। 
āgamān anatikramya satāṃ vṛttam avekṣya ca। 
dharma eva manaḥ Kṛṣṇe svabhāvāc caiva me dhṛtam॥ 
[…]ativādān madāc caiva mā dharmam atiśaṅkithāḥ। 
dharmātiśaṅkī puruṣas tiryaggatiparāyaṇaḥ॥ 
 
I do not act in quest of the fruits of the Law; I give because I must!  I sacrifice 
because I must!  Whether it bears fruit or not, I do, buxom Draupadī,69 according 
to my ability, what a person who has a household is beholden to do.  I obey the 
Law, full-hipped woman, not because of its reward, but in order not to transgress 
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the traditions and to look to the conduct of the strict.  By its nature my mind is 
beholden to the Law…Don’t doubt the Law, out of argumentativeness or mere 
folly, for the man who doubts the Law ends up an animal.70  
 
Again, Yudhiṣṭhira, like Kṛṣṇa, answers with a deferral.  Instead of addressing the nature 
of her doubts, Yudhiṣṭhira simply rebukes her for doubting at all.  He then describes the 
Law as a kind of categorical imperative, while simultaneously emphasizing his own sense 
of psychological dependency on the Law as what makes him human.  In the end, 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s argument is not really an argument at all, but rather a heartfelt plea for 
Draupadī to return to the circular logic of tradition and pledge herself anew to the Law 
that failed her. 
While Kṛṣṇa promises her an improvement, Yudhiṣṭhira resorts to an ad baculum 
argument by saying that Draupadī’s doubts about the Law leave her vulnerable to lose 
more than she already has.  In both cases, Kṛṣṇa and Yudhiṣṭhira stress an ethic of 
pativratā that consists of loyalty to both one’s husband and one’s dharma, and in the 
process, they ignore the corresponding ethic of protection that is rakṣaṇa dharma.71  In 
this way, they exempt the Law—and by implication themselves—from providing the 
necessary protection that would actually make them worthy of such loyalty. 
GĀNDHĀRĪ’S ARGUMENT 
This same motif of the virtuous woman, betrayed by Dharma and ravaged by 
Time dominates the Strī Parvan, in which the blameless wives of all the warriors slain in 
the battle of Kurukṣetra are left with the devastating choice of either living out their lives 
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and karmayoga,” in  ender and  arrative in the Mahābhārata, ed. Simon Brodbeck and Brian Black, 
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as widows, or else committing suttee.  As before, both Time and Kṛṣṇa are blamed, but 
this time, it is not Draupadī but Gāndhārī who accuses him.  Having lost every last one of 
her hundred sons, Gāndhārī occupies a prominent place in the chorus of mourning 
widows in the Strī Parvan.  United with Kuntī and Draupadī by virtue of their shared 
grief at the death of their respective sons, Gāndhārī attempts to comfort Draupadī, saying, 
maivaṃ putrīti śokārtā paśya mām api duḥkhitām॥ 
manye lokavināśo 'yaṃ kālaparyāya coditaḥ। 
avaśya bhāvī saṃprāptaḥ svabhāvāl lomaharṣaṇaḥ॥ 
idaṃ tat samanuprāptaṃ Vidurasya vaco mahat। 
asiddhānunaye Kṛṣṇe yad uvāca mahāmatiḥ॥ 
tasminn aparihārye 'rthe vyatīte ca viśeṣataḥ। 
mā śuco na hi śocyās te saṃgrāme nidhanaṃ gatāḥ॥ 
yathaiva tvaṃ tathaivāhaṃ ko vā māśvāsayiṣyati। 
mamaiva hy aparādhena kulam agryaṃ vināśitam॥ 
 
Do not be tormented with grief, girl.  See how even I am suffering miserably.  I 
think this horrifying devastation of the world was brought on by the turning of 
Time.  It necessarily had to be, and it came to pass automatically.  What happened 
here is just what Vidura predicted in the great speech he made after Kṛṣṇa failed 
to persuade the Kauravas.  Do not grieve for something that cannot be averted, 
and especially not for what is past.  And really, those who met their end in battle 
should not be mourned.  It’s the same for me as it is for you.  Who’s going to 
comfort me?  It was my wrong that brought this eminent family to extinction.72 
 
Once again, Time is described as the cause of the war, but in this particular instance, 
Gāndhārī seems to depict Time as a non-sentient force of nature—even going so far as to 
take comfort in its sheer implacable impersonality.  However, Gāndhārī fails to find 
comfort in her own assurances and quickly shifts the blame to herself.  One possible 
interpretation of this shift is that Gāndhārī finds the prospect of a cold, impersonal, 
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meaningless Fate so unnerving that she would much rather blame herself and deal with 
all the self-loathing that inevitably entails, presumably because at least, that way, her 
actions retain a sense of agency and meaning. 
 Nevertheless, her condemnation of Time reoccurs when she confronts Kṛṣṇa.  
After listing the great warriors of the Kaurava army, she says, 
ye hanyuḥ śastravegena devān api nararṣabhāḥ॥ 
ta ime nihatāḥ saṃkhye paśya kālasya paryayam। 
nātibhāro 'sti daivasya dhruvaṃ Mādhava kaś cana। 
yad ime nihatāḥ śūrāḥ kṣatriyaiḥ kṣatriyarṣabhāḥ॥ 
tadaiva nihatāḥ Kṛṣṇa mama putrās tarasvinaḥ। 
yadaivākṛta kāmas tvam upaplavyaṃ gataḥ punaḥ॥ 
 
Those bulls of men could kill even the Gods with the power of their weapons, but 
they were all cut down in the war.  See how Time turns!  Certainly there is no 
charge too heavy for fate, Mādhava, for these heroic kṣatriya bulls were killed by 
kṣatriyas.  My impetuous sons were dead already, Kṛṣṇa, when you returned to 
Upalavya without having accomplished what you wanted.73  
 
Again, she stresses the inevitability of Time, but in this instance, it provokes not comfort 
but indignant rage, as she declares with all the futile shock and horror previously 
expressed by Draupadī: “Certainly there is no charge too heavy for fate.”  As before with 
Draupadī, the language of Time as a sentient force inevitably leads to a discussion of its 
divisive cruelty as “kṣatriya bulls” are killed by other “kṣatriyas” in direct parallel to 
Draupadī’s claim that Fate kills “creatures with creatures.”74 
 Like Draupadī, Gāndhārī also holds Kṛṣṇa accountable in a double sense as both 
himself and Time.  This becomes clear when her argument intensifies: 
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upekṣitā vinaśyantas tvayā kasmāj janārdana॥ 
śaktena bahu bhṛtyena vipule tiṣṭhatā bale। 
ubhayatra samarthena śrutavākyena caiva ha॥ 
icchatopekṣito nāśaḥ kurūṇāṃ madhusūdana। 
yasmāt tvayā mahābāho phalaṃ tasmād avāpnuhi॥ 
 
Why did you ignore them as they perished, Janārdana?  You who were able to do 
something, who had many retainers, who stood in the midst of an extensive army, 
who had an equal interest in both sides, who had heard all that was said?  And 
since you neglected the destruction of the Kurus, O Slayer of Madhu, because you 
wanted it, O man of mighty arms, now take the result of that.75   
 
At this point, Gāndhārī takes the association of Kṛṣṇa with Time to its logical conclusion, 
because if Kṛṣṇa truly is the single greatest force behind the Bhārata war, then he is not 
the well-meaning diplomatic failure he claims to be, but rather a traitor who is complicit 
in death of Gāndhārī’s sons.  Gāndhārī emphasizes this claim by referring to Kṛṣṇa as 
Janārdana (“the aGītātor of men”), thereby highlighting his destructive qualities.  She 
also argues that in the final analysis, Kṛṣṇa “wanted” the slaughter of her sons to occur, 
despite her previous, parallel statement that Kṛṣṇa “wanted” to broker a bloodless peace 
between the two armies.76  It is this revelation that prompts Gāndhārī to finally gather her 
powers accumulated through her numerous devotional practices to her husband and use 
them to destroy Kṛṣṇa who, with all his power as the ruler of the universe, failed to 
reward her loyalty to the principles of pativratā dharma.  Moreover, to reflect the true 
horror of her experiences, Gāndhārī stresses that this same curse carries over to the 
entirety of Kṛṣṇa’s kingdom, so that his family, like her own, will now be destroyed 
entirely by his actions. 
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 In reply, Kṛṣṇa, in one of the most understated but chilling moments in the entire 
epic, replies “with a bit of a smile” (abhyutsmayat):77 
saṃhartā Vṛṣṇicakrasya nānyo mad vidyate śubhe। 
jāne 'ham etad apy evaṃ cīrṇaṃ carasi kṣatriye॥ 
avadhyās te narair anyair api vā devadānavaiḥ। 
parasparakṛtaṃ nāśam ataḥ prāpsyanti Yādavāḥ॥ 
 
Good woman, no one but I will be the destroyer of the circle of the Vṛṣṇis.  I 
know this to be so.  Kṣatriya woman, you are doing what has already been done.  
The Yādavas cannot be killed by other men, nor even by the Gods or Dānavas, so 
they will come to their destruction at each other’s hands.78  
 
Cursed to suffer a catastrophic family tragedy on the scale of Kurukṣetra, Kṛṣṇa betrays 
his own inhuman nature by reacting to the news with a kind of callous smugness.  In this 
passage, Gāndhārī wants Kṛṣṇa to suffer the same horror and loss as she has, but to her 
dismay, she finds that this impossible because Kṛṣṇa already knows the decree of Fate 
and wills it to be so.  Where Gāndhārī had intended the curse to be an expression of her 
own agency as a wrathful mother possessed of great ascetic heat, Kṛṣṇa reveals that this 
too is part of his grand design.  In other words, this exchange leads us to believe that 
Draupadī was right all along and all of the characters in the Mahābhārata are merely 
“puppets”79  for Kṛṣṇa to play with.  The text tells us that upon hearing this, “the 
Pāṇḍavas were shaken…extremely upset and had no desire to live.” (Pāṇḍavās 
trastacetasaḥ babhūvur bhṛśasaṃvignā nirāśāś cāpi jīvite).80   Kṛṣṇa continues his 
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argument, once again blaming Gāndhārī for failing to restrain her son and reminding her 
that 
mṛtaṃ vā yadi vā naṣṭaṃ yo 'tītam anuśocati। 
duḥkhena labhate duḥkhaṃ dvāv anarthau prapadyate॥ 
tapo 'rthīyaṃ brāhmaṇī dhatta garbhaṃ; gaur voḍhāraṃ dhāvitāraṃ 
turaṃgī। 
śūdrā dāsaṃ paśupālaṃ tu vaiśyā; vadhārthīyaṃ tvadvidhā rājaputrī॥ 
 
Anyone who grieves over someone who is dead, or something that has been 
destroyed, or something that has passed by gains misery from their misery.  He 
comes to two evils.  A Brahmin woman brings forth a baby destined for 
asceticism, a cow brings forth a draft animal, a mare a racehorse, a śūdra woman a 
servant, a vaiśya woman a cowherd—but a kṣatriya woman like you brings forth a 
baby destined for slaughter.81  
 
Once again, the issue of Kṛṣṇa’s culpability is papered over by more conventional—if not 
terribly comforting—explanations in an effort to distract from the sheer existential horror 
implied by Kṛṣṇa’s godhood.  Like Draupadī, Gāndhārī struggles to understand the role 
of Kṛṣṇa and Time in the Kurukṣetra war, but where Draupadī can be successfully talked 
down by her husband, Gāndhārī persists and even succeeds in exacting some kind of 
retribution.  In the end, however, Kṛṣṇa’s acceptance of his death merely reinforces 
Gāndhārī’s lack of agency.  Like Draupadī, her grievances are dismissed outright and she 
is urged instead to simply seek detachment and remain loyal to the dharma, all the while 
maintaining the tacit awareness that none of her actions seem to matter on any ultimate 
level. 
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UTTANKA’S ARGUMENT 
 Though the misfire of Gāndhārī’s curse seems to provide a fitting, if terrifying, 
resolution to the question of Kṛṣṇa’s theodicy, Gāndhārī’s objections are parroted later on 
in the epic by Uttanka, who accuses Kṛṣṇa of indifference in the face of the Kurukṣetra 
war and likewise threatens to curse him.   This section comes across as an afterthought, 
because Uttanka is neither a major character, nor is he closely connected to the action of 
the story.  Nevertheless, Kṛṣṇa’s reply to Uttanka is relevant, because in this specific 
case, he replies differently, even though faced with the same set of accusations.  
 Where Kṛṣṇa replied to Gāndhārī’s curse by blaming her for the war while 
simultaneously denying her agency as a slave of Fate, he merely warns Uttanka not to 
expend his tapas by conjuring a powerful curse.  Kṛṣṇa even goes so far as to offer an 
apology (gṛha anunayam; literally “receive my courtesy”)82 to Uttanka for causing him to 
risk his hard-earned ascetic heat.  This apology is followed by an elaborately theological 
self-introduction by Kṛṣṇa, who describes himself as the universal soul, the origin of both 
the “existent and non-existent,” the “eternal god of gods,” the source of all beings as well 
as their destroyer, the rites of sacrifice, the sacrifice and the sacrificial offering, and also 
Vishnu, Indra, and Brahma, etc.83  In its epic list of divine names, aspects, and functions, 
Kṛṣṇa’s speech recalls the Bhagavad Gītā and true to form, it ends with an account of his 
descent as an avatāra: 
dharmasya setuṃ badhnāmi calite calite yuge। 
tās tā yonīḥ praviśyāhaṃ prajānāṃ hitakāmyayā॥ 
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yadā tv ahaṃ deva yonau vartāmi Bhṛgunandana। 
tadāhaṃ devavat sarvam ācarāmi na saṃśayaḥ॥ 
yadā gandharvayonau tu vartāmi Bhṛgunandana। 
tadā gandharvavac ceṣṭāḥ sarvāś ceṣṭāmi Bhārgava॥ 
nāgayonau yadā caiva tadā vartāmi nāgavat। 
yakṣarākṣasa yonīś ca yathāvad vicarāmy aham॥ 
 
In every Yuga I have to repair the causeway of Righteousness, entering into 
diverse kinds of wombs from desire of doing good to my creatures. When, O son 
of Bhrigu's race, I live in the order of the deities, I then verily act in every respect 
as a deity. When I live in the order of the Gandharvas, I then, O son of Bhrigu's 
race, act in every respect as a Gandharva. When I live in the order of the Nagas, I 
then act as a Naga, and when I live in the order of Yakshas or that of Rakshasas, I 
act after the manner of that order.84  
 
For whatever reason, it is in the presence of Uttanka that Kṛṣṇa finally deigns to answer 
one of his critics85 in a relatively straightforward manner.  Moreover, Kṛṣṇa’s argument is 
notable in that it certainly does not remove all doubt about his innocence, but it does 
make explicit a number of claims regarding his own inhuman nature that were merely 
hinted at by Draupadī and Gāndhārī. 
 To be sure, the Kṛṣṇa avatar serves less to “repair the causeway of Righteousness” 
(dharmasya setuṃ badhnāmi) than it does to facilitate the deaths of several thousand 
people, Kṛṣṇa admits that he let the victims of Kurukṣetra die simply because he was 
pretending to be a human at this time.  While some scholars have taken this explanation 
to mean that Kṛṣṇa is neither truly omniscient nor omnipotent,86 there is nothing in the 
text to suggest that a being as powerful as Kṛṣṇa is not entirely in control every step of 
                                                 
84 Mbh 14.53.15b-18. 
85 Compared to the two queens, Arjuna is not terribly critical of his friend Kṛṣṇa.  Thus, the extensive 
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86 See Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 201-202; as well as Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Kṛṣṇa: In Defence of a 
Devious Divinity.” In Essa s on the Mahābhārata, ed. Arvind Sharma, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 410. 
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the way.  A careful reading of this passage implies that Kṛṣṇa’s incarnation does not 
imply disempowerment, but rather an elaborate pretense of humanity.87   
Furthermore, while Kṛṣṇa does not directly take responsibility for his actions as 
Time, he nonetheless sees fit to justify the influence of the Law of time (kāladharman)88 
by reassuring Uttanka that, because of their valor in battle, all of the fallen warriors have 
been granted access heaven.  In this way, Kṛṣṇa affirms Doniger’s claim that “the gods 
may allow men to be happy in heaven...but never on earth.”89  By affirming his own 
double nature as both a human who acts as if ignorant of Fate, as well as a metaphysical 
force that acts altogether without respect to the lives, morals, or struggles of humanity, 
Kṛṣṇa essentially proves Draupadī and Gāndhārī right in terms of his own nature as an 
inhuman doppelganger living among humans that yet refuses to help those in need or 
even to uphold rakṣaṇa dharma in protecting those who presumably deserve such 
protection.  In the end, the only dharma that truly seems to matter is the merciless Law of 
Time. 
Examining the Witnesses: Gendered Ethics in the Mahābhārata 
 In order to understand the full import Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s arguments, it is 
necessary to understand their place in the wider universe of the Mahābhārata, in terms of 
Time, gender, and the complex system of incarnations, partial-incarnations, and 
theological affinities that frames the human element of the text.  This framework is 
                                                 
87 That is to say, a  ī ā.  For the theological implications of this term, see William Sax, “The Ramnagar 
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“assailed by the virtue of Time,” but could be more directly rendered as “seized by the Law of Time.” 
89 Doniger O’Flaherty, The Origins of Evil, 271. 
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established early on in the Ādi Parvan, where the Earth, overwhelmed by the number of 
former Asuras being born as human kings, entreats the gods to relieve her burden.90  The 
gods agree, of course, and the mission begins when virtually all of the divine beings 
incarnate themselves in the hope of instigating massive war that will drastically reduce 
the human population.  The chief orchestrator behind this effort is Nārāyaṇa/Viṣṇu, who 
incarnates himself as Kṛṣṇa,91 but the list of incarnations also includes every other major 
character in the epic, including Draupadī and Gāndhārī, who serve as the embodiments of 
“a part of Śrī”92 and “Wisdom”93 (mati), respectively. 
 Like so many other aspects of the Mahābhārata, the godly origins of Draupadī 
and Gāndhārī are pregnant with deeper meaning, but also tinged with a cruel irony.  It is 
fitting, for example, that Draupadī, as the personification of Prosperity (śrī) would be “a 
queen of kings”94 who, as the power behind the throne, commands a massive kingdom, 
but this theological affinity is also subversive, because it implies that the goddess of 
Prosperity herself is forced to live as a penniless exile for over a decade, while 
simultaneously reduced to a kind of symbolic widowhood.95  The same principle holds 
true for Gāndhārī as an incarnation of Wisdom who, true to form, functions as an 
exceedingly wise advisor of the king, but is nevertheless unable to make him heed her 
advice.  Her solidarity with her husband causes her to live as a blind woman, and she also 
                                                 
90 Mbh 1.58-59. 
91 Mbh 1.61.90-95. 
92 Mbh 1.61.95-100. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Mb 3.13.110-120. 
95 Alf Hiltebeitel, hen the  oddess as a oman: Mahābhārata Ethnographies: Essa s, (Leiden: Brill, 
2011), 30. 
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engages in a failed abortion that leaves her malformed, blindly passionate children alive 
to threaten the continuation of the dynasty and even the kingdom itself.  The manner in 
which these incarnations both fulfil and defy expectation contributes to the aesthetics of 
suffering, because in the world of the Mahābhārata, the suffering of these women is seen 
as symptomatic of a greater cosmic imbalance. 
 As Kevin McGrath notes, “grief is the one quality or sign which marks women”96 
in the Mahābhārata and as the single most “exceptional”97 example of this trend, 
Draupadī, with all her attendant roles and symbolic functions suggests a number of useful 
theological lenses through which to view her particular aesthetics of suffering.  As such, 
the next three subsections will deal with the ethical complications implied by Draupadī’s 
role as the wife of “King Dharma,” the wife of Yudhiṣṭhira, and also as an embodiment 
of Śrī that is also, secondarily, associated with Viṣṇu’s other wife: the Earth. 
PATIVRATA  AND DHARMIC DECLINE 
The most immediate of these frameworks arises from the intimate relationship 
with the Law (dharma) implied by Draupadī’s marriage to the “portion of Dharma” 
incarnated as Yudhiṣṭhira.98  Likewise, a faint echo of this connection can be seen in the 
epic’s description of Gāndhārī as one who is “yoked to the Law”99 and “who had seen the 
Law.”100 
 For both Draupadī and Gāndhārī, the most salient Law is pativratā dharma, or the 
dharma of the devoted wife.  In short, pativratā dharma requires its practitioners to view 
                                                 
96 Kevin McGrath, quoted in Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 74. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Mbh 1.61.80-85. 
99 Mbh 2.66.25-30. 
100 Mbh 2.66.35-40. 
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their husband as “God.”101  This perspective can manifest itself in relatively mundane 
ways, such as Draupadī’s refusal to eat foods that her husbands dislike,102 her abstention 
from cosmetics in their absence,103 and Gāndhārī’s practice of not even speaking of men 
other than her husband.104   However, as Arti Dhand describes in oman as  ire, oman 
as  age   e ual  deology in the Mahābhārata, the ideology of pativratā extends beyond 
matters of etiquette and into the realm of ascetic extremes: 
[I]f the husband, however lacking in personal virtues himself, should command 
the wife to accomplish anything at all, even what is improper or unrighteous or 
leads to her very death, the wife should unhesitatingly accomplish it, taking 
recourse in the law of Distress.105 
 
Falling under the dictates of “the law of Distress” (āpaddharma), pativratā dharma is 
understood in the epic to be the ultimate priority of its heroines, even though it results in 
such calamities as voluntary exile, symbolic blindness, or suttee, which Dhand refers to 
as its “logical end.”106   
It is in the service of this same value of pativratā dharma that Draupadī concludes 
her speech in the assembly hall by asking her husbands’ family: 
tām imāṃ Dharmarājasya bhāryāṃ sadṛśavarṇajām। 
brūta dāsīm adāsīṃ vā tat kariṣyāmi Kauravāḥ॥ 
 
Is the wife of the King Dharma [i.e. Yudhiṣṭhira] whose birth matches his a slave 
or free?  Speak, Kauravas.  I shall abide by your answer.107 
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105 Dhand, Woman as Fire, 173. 
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As in other instances of extreme pativratā dharma, the operative question here is not 
what is equitable or beneficial, but simply what the husbands want.  That being said, 
Draupadī’s reference to her oldest husband Yudhiṣṭhira as “King Dharma” (dharmarāja) 
here is not entirely devoid of irony either, because Yudhiṣṭhira’s failure protect his wife 
also implies a failure to uphold his own dharma.  
As Simon Brodbeck notes in his treatment of Draupadī and Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
relationship, pativratā dharma is only one half of a “mutually supportive”108 gendered 
pair.  The other half is the masculine ethic of protection known as rakṣaṇa dharma, 
which, as shown above, is sometimes more of an ideal than a reality in the epic.  While 
some of the blame could perhaps be placed on Yudhiṣṭhira himself, the young king’s 
apparent moral impotence is also reflected in the various Mahābhārata stories in which 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s father Dharma is likewise subject to powers beyond his control.  By 
portraying the personification of Law as disempowered or compromised in some way, 
these stories effectively dramatize the universal decline of human morality that occurs in 
the universe of the text. 
The most dramatic of these incidents occurs in the Ādi Parvan, when the sage 
Māṇḍavya is forcibly impaled on a stake as karmic retribution for acts committed as 
child.  He then curses Dharma: 
alpe 'parādhe vipulo mama daṇḍas tvayā kṛtaḥ। 
śūdrayonāv ato dharmamānuṣaḥ saṃbhaviṣyasi॥ 
maryādāṃ sthāpayāmy adya loke dharmaphalodayām। 
                                                 
108 Brodbeck, “Gendered soteriology,” 165-166. 
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ācaturdaśamād varṣān na bhaviṣyati pātakam। 
pareṇa kurvatām evaṃ doṣa eva bhaviṣyati॥ 
 
The sin was small and the penalty you dealt me vast.  Law, for that you shall be 
born a man from the womb of a serf!  Now I lay down the limit on the fruition of 
the Law: nothing shall be a sin up to the age of fourteen years; but if they do it 
beyond that age it shall be counted an offense.109 
 
Within the greater epic, this curse does little more than provide an occasion for Dharma 
to be reborn as the “serf” (śūdra) Vidura, but the fact that someone like Māṇḍavya is 
even able to do this is staggering, because it shows that even Dharma is not so powerful 
that he cannot be brought low by the powers of an imperfect human.  More importantly, 
the curse is rich with irony because Māṇḍavya is retaliating specifically against the 
perceived injustices meted out by Dharma, who is supposed to represent justice itself. 
 Both the relative impotence and the moral decay of Dharma are explained later on 
in the Vana Parvan, where the theory of the yugas is explained in detail by the legendary 
monkey Hanumān and the great sage Mārkaṇḍeya.  Once again the culprit is Time, as 
Hanumān explains when he prefaces his discussion of the yugas, “Time is 
inescapable.”110  For Dharma, the inescapability of Time manifests itself in the constant 
decline of universal morality throughout the four yugas, which begin with Dharma 
possessing four “quarters” or “feet” (pādas)111 and end with a crippled, depleted Dharma, 
who possesses only a single pāda.112  It should also be noted that in this context, Time is 
not treated as an abstract entity either, because according to Hanumān, it is expressly a 
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function of the progression of Time into the Kali Yuga that the god Viṣṇu becomes 
“black” (kṛṣṇa).  Mārkaṇḍeya later corroborates this view in his own discussion of the 
yugas, in which Kṛṣṇa is described as both the beginning and end of all things.113 
 The decline of the Law is relevant to Draupadī’s situation because, as Dhand 
notes, the concept of the yugas are also closely intertwined with the discourse on women, 
who are seen as “repositories of class and family identity”114 that inevitably reflect the 
moral fabric of society.  Thus, in Mārkaṇḍeya’s description of the Kali Yuga, the 
breakdown of traditional gender roles is described in two ways.  In one respect, the Kali 
Yuga entails the utter extinction of pativratā dharma as women “cast off all morals”115 
and engage in various sorts of non-normative behavior, but the Kali Yuga also marks the 
death of rakṣaṇa dharma, in which the violence of men engulfs the Earth and rape 
replaces marriage as the dominant sexual institution.116  This latter situation is prefigured 
in the disrobing scene, where Draupadī’s devotion to her husbands and to dharma goes 
unreciprocated and she is instead left to the mercy of Duryodhana, who represents the 
Kali Yuga incarnate.117  Thus to a certain extent, the disrobing represents not only the 
failure of the Pāṇḍavas, but the failure of Dharma himself to act in any substantial way.118 
PRAVṚTTI DHARMA AND YUDHIṢṬHIRA’S DILEMMA 
When it comes to Yudhiṣṭhira’s failure to uphold rakṣaṇa dharma, the problem is 
not so much one of impotence or even a failure of nerve, so much as it is Yudhiṣṭhira 
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mistakenly choosing one form of dharma over another.  In Dhand’s terms, the choice is 
between worldly, pravṛtti dharma, in which people “continue to perform their social 
functions and duties”119 while simultaneously acknowledging that these tasks do not 
reflect “the ultimate path,”120 and renunciant, nivṛtti dharma, in which the “ultimate path” 
of liberation is pursued to the expense of all else.121   However, a careful analysis reveals 
that the value of vairāgya can contribute to either of these dharmas.  According to 
Hudson, 
The underlying emotion of śāntarasa [i.e. the dominant rasa of the 
Mahābhārata], according to [Ānandavardhana], is vairāgya, which generally 
means ‘disgust,’ ‘aversion,’ or ‘indifference to worldly objects and life.’  Lest we 
be tempted to rush to label Ānanda’s reading of the Mahābhārata as ‘pessimistic’ 
or ‘world-negating,’ however, we should be very clear about what the 
disillusionment denoted by the term vairāgya is targeting.  Śāntarasa and its 
related underlying emotion (sthāyibhāva) of vairāgya are deeply connected with 
the issue of time and transitoriness in the Mahābhārata according to Ānanda.  As 
Gerow and Aklujkar argue, Ānanda used the term śāntarasa to refer to ‘an intense 
experience of detachment that comes from reading or witnessing a work of art 
depicting ruin, impermanence, the transitory character of worldly existence and 
the futility of ambition.’…This suggests that what the sensitive reader/spectator is 
being encouraged to feel aversion toward, according to Ānanda, is not the 
empirical/natural world per se, but a particular psychological state or attitude with 
regard to the empirical world—namely egoism—that renders human beings 
emotionally vulnerable to feelings of suffering and grief over the losses that are 
brought about by the inevitable ravages of time.122 
 
In other words, as a value that advocates detachment from the ego, vairāgya is not merely 
a synonym for nivṛtti dharma (which simply demands a withdrawal from the world), but 
rather a broader principle that accommodates both nivṛtti and pravṛtti dharmas.   
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Thus, when Yudhiṣṭhira justifies his passivity in the dice game by saying “But 
this world obeys the Placer’s design—I do not refuse now to play with those 
gamblers,”123 he is engaging in nivrtti dharma, whereas Hudson’s reading124 and the 
teachings of the Gītā125 recommend engaging in pravṛtti dharma, albeit with a detached, 
vairāgya perspective.  Simply put, he rejects a dharma of detached action in favor of a 
dharma of inaction, and the kingdom suffers for it. 
 Like the previously discussed pair of pativratā and rakṣaṇa dharma, nivṛtti and 
pravṛtti dharma can also be seen as gendered concepts.  According to Simon Brodbeck, 
the Mahābhārata is just one of many stories of the Indian epic tradition in which the 
tension between nivṛtti and pravṛtti dharma is played out via “the possibility of the man 
abandoning the wife.”126  This gendered analogy is made possible by the “hierarchically 
gendered terms”127 of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition, in which the higher, 
changeless, spiritual principle of puruṣa is coded as masculine, while its lower, ever-
changing, material counterpart prakṛti is seen as feminine.  In this way, the idea of a male 
subject flirting with the possibility of engaging in nivṛtti dharma is dramatized in stories 
about men attempting to leave their wives, because the gendered terminology of 
Sāṃkhya implies that as the metaphorical “daughters of prakṛti,”128 women are often 
viewed as “sexual objects,”129 that are more physical, “more sense-oriented than men,”130 
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and as such, seen living embodiments of the temptations that imply “bondage to the 
world.”131 
However, Brodbeck is quick to add that within these stories, the possibility of 
spousal abandonment never comes to fruition.  Instead, the male protagonist remains 
engaged in both the marriage and the world, pursuing the pravṛtti dharma of detached, 
but deliberate action.  Yudhiṣṭhira himself eventually falls into this pattern as well, but in 
the specific context of the disrobing scene, he remains befuddled by both the decline of 
dharma and the turning of Time, and, as a result, fails to follow the course of detached 
pravṛtti dharma that would allow him to practice detachment, while simultaneously 
honoring the ethical demands of rakṣaṇa dharma. 
SOTERIOLOGY AND QUEENSHIP 
 Yet another dimension of analysis opens up when one considers that despite its 
gendered language, Dhand argues that the true philosophical core of Sāṃkhya “has 
nothing to do with gender.”132  Once the concepts of puruṣa and prakṛti are divorced 
from gender and instead addressed as the component parts of the human being, it 
becomes clear that women can also act as “soteriological subjects,”133 who are faced with 
a similar choice between pravṛtti and nivṛtti dharma.  Seen in this light, pativratās such 
as Draupadī, who are detached from the world, but nevertheless engaged in serving their 
husbands, become exemplars of pravṛtti dharma.   
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Moreover, the ideal pativratā s devotion to her husband as a “god”134 bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the devotion involved in serving an actual god.  This parallel is 
played out in Draupadī’s associations with both Śrī and the Earth,135 who, as the dual 
wives of Viṣṇu,136 also serve to reinforce Draupadī’s connection with Kṛṣṇa.137  While it 
is certainly true that the disrobing of Draupadī forms a structural parallel with the burden 
of the Earth as an instance of female victimization that eventually provokes the battle of 
Kurukṣetra,138 Śrī and the Earth form a significant pair that represent not only the wives 
of Viṣṇu, but also the symbolic wives of the king,139 and the “female symbolic units”140 
that must be renounced by the traditional ascetic in pursuit of nivṛtti dharma.   
All three of these paired connections are relevant to the trials experienced by 
Draupadī and Gāndhārī, because in addition to their identical status as queens, both of 
their husbands are inspired by Fate to forsake the obligations of rakṣaṇa dharma,141 and 
in both cases, the circumstances that arise from the failure of the husband eventually lead 
them to question Fate himself in the guise of Kṛṣṇa.  Indeed, their arguments against 
Kṛṣṇa are by far the most salient, because where Yudhiṣṭhira and Dhṛtarāṣṭra are 
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befuddled by Fate and morally crippled by the decline of dharma, Kṛṣṇa, as Time itself 
incarnate, has no such excuse.  Moreover, as “female symbolic units” intimately tied to 
both the world (Earth) and its fortunes (Śrī) and as famously steadfast wives dedicated to 
the selfless service of pativratā dharma, Draupadī and Gāndhārī are uniquely qualified to 
make these arguments, because they remain actively involved in human affairs but 
nevertheless devoted to a higher purpose.  Thus, when Draupadī and Gāndhārī question 
Kṛṣṇa, they do so not merely as the victims of male neglect, but as philosophically-
minded “soteriological subjects”142 confronting a universal human problem, and by 
extension, as representatives of humanity itself. 
In Defence of a Dark Lord: Answering the Aesthetics of Suffering 
Despite the complex arguments put forth by Draupadī, Yudhiṣṭhira, Gāndhārī, 
Uttanka, and Kṛṣṇa, the epic never provides any kind of answer that accounts for all of 
these objections in a coherent fashion, at least not explicitly.  Like Kṛṣṇa’s moral 
interlocutors, readers who hope to discover a cohesive theodicy in the Mahābhārata have 
no choice but to cobble together a diverse patchwork various implications, hints, half-
stated theological doctrines, and inconclusive arguments in order to produce anything 
resembling a unified theory. 
MATILAL’S ARGUMENT 
Of these readers, one of the most gifted is Bimal Krishna Matilal, who states his 
case in an essay entitled, “Kṛṣṇa: In Defence of a Devious Divinity.”  In true 
Mahābhārata fashion, Matilal seems unable or unwilling to come up with a single 
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definitive reason and instead, assails his readers with a number of miscellaneous 
possibilities. Matilal’s primary argument is that as “the God of the Yogins,”143 the “dark 
Lord”144 Kṛṣṇa is omnibenevolent, but not actually omnipotent.  In this scenario, Kṛṣṇa’s 
morally dubious behavior, in both action and inaction, is necessary in order to establish 
“new paradigms” of human ethics that exploit the “limitations” of traditional moral 
practices such as “truth-telling and promise-keeping”145 and in doing so, aid humankind 
in alleviating the greater evil that is the burden of the Earth, which he interprets morally 
as a “burden of sin.”146  However, all of the above arguments rely on Matilal’s 
misreading of Kṛṣṇa’s response to Uttanka as a denial of omnipotence.  Once Kṛṣṇa’s 
omnipotence has been restored to the equation, these proposed solutions fall flat, because 
a reasonably intelligent, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent Kṛṣṇa would naturally find a 
way to prevent great evil, not with a lesser evil, but with a greater good. 
Not entirely satisfied by the above line of reasoning, Matilal also hedges his bets 
by describing the problem of evil as endemic to the universe itself, or rather the kind of 
universe that gives rise to the human condition.  In his conclusion, Matilal describes the 
design of the universe in terms of three possible worlds that provide alternative models.  
The first world, W1, is an “amoral world,”147 operated solely by the rational dictates of 
science.  W2 is a more human world, in which good and evil exist in a state of constant 
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struggle, but with the “persistent belief that good will win at the end.”148  W3 then is a 
“perfect world” in which only good exists and the concept of evil is entirely unknown, 
but “the meaning of happiness is perhaps lost.”149  Matilal then concludes, 
Now, if a divine creator is faced with the choice of creating a world like any one 
of this, which particular one would He select?  For various reasons into which I 
do not wish to go into here, I suggest that he would select W2…Whether there is a 
creator God or not, whether Kṛṣṇa was a devious deity or not, this is the kind of 
world we have got and hence if justice can be salvaged in the end the creator will 
fulfil His promise.150 
 
While Matilal does not elucidate the “various reasons” W2 is preferable, he does hint that 
it has something to do with the notion that the presence of evil is necessary for the 
possibility of meaningful happiness, but this notion too assumes that Kṛṣṇa is not 
omnipotent to the point where he can accomplish his goals without unintended, 
undesirable consequences.  On the other hand, if meaningful happiness in the absence of 
evil is within the purview of an omnipotent Kṛṣṇa, then the current state of the universe 
as seen in the Mahābhārata poses a seemingly unanswerable question. 
 In the end, Matilal’s conclusion is less convincing than his earlier statement that 
“Kṛṣṇa’s role was not to resolve the ambiguity but to heighten the mystery”151 of the epic.  
Alf Hiltebeitel echoes this sentiment when he describes how in regard to Gāndhārī’s 
arguments in particular, “there is no doubt that they capture the surface events and 
produce charges that any ‘secular’ judge would honor in the courtroom.  But they do not 
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capture the essential.”152  In both cases, the consensus seems to be that there is an inner, 
hidden moral reality within the epic that can only be truly understood on faith.   
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE 
In his discussion of Hindu mythology, Mircea Eliade is even more concise when 
he says, “What is true in eternity is not necessarily true in time.”153  Such a blunt, 
counterintuitive statement may be difficult to understand offhand, but it nevertheless 
seems to apply to the Mahābhārata as a work concerned with both Time and eternity. 
 Kṛṣṇa’s arguments with Draupadī and Gāndhārī in particular assume a unique 
theological dimension in light of the Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa says: 
aham evākṣayaḥ kālo dhātāhaṃ viśvatomukhaḥ॥ 
mṛtyuḥ sarvaharaś cāham udbhavaś ca bhaviṣyatām। 
kīrtiḥ śrīr vāk ca nārīṇāṃ smṛtir medhā dhṛtiḥ kṣamā॥ 
 
I am everlasting Time, the Placer who looks everywhere, I am all-snatching 
Death, and the Source of things yet to be.  Of feminines I am Fame, Beauty, 
Speech, Recollection, Wisdom, Fortitude, and Patience.154 
 
In these verses, Kṛṣṇa’s destructive role as Time/Fate is offset by a list of positive 
feminine concepts (nārīs), including Śrī (“Beauty”) and “Wisdom” (medhā),155 which 
directly parallels the account of Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s incarnations in the Ādi 
Parvan.156  When one takes these connections seriously, Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s 
                                                 
152 Hiltebeitel, The Ritual of Battle, 288. 
153 Mircea Eliade, quoted in Doniger, Origins of Evil, 59. 
154 Mbh 6.32.33b-34. 
155 In all fairness, Gāndhārī is described as an incarnation of mati, rather than medhā, but van Buitenen 
sees no reason distinguish the two in his translation.  The parallel usage of śrī, on the other hand, is direct, 
even though van Buitenen glosses it here as “Beauty.”  See Mbh 1.61.95-100. 
156 This similarity is further compounded by the plural genitive nārīṇāṃ, which van Buitenen translates as 
“Of feminines,” but it could also be taken in a more literal sense, as “Among women.”   
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previous arguments against Kṛṣṇa acquire an entirely different tone, because that means 
that on a broader, theological level, those arguments essentially reflect a debate between 
a god and a feminine version of himself.157  In this context, Kṛṣṇa’s reaction to 
Gāndhārī’s curse makes more sense, because it implies that Kṛṣṇa can only be truly 
threatened by another part of himself.  Thus, when a hunter named Jarā finally kills Kṛṣṇa 
in the Mausala Parvan, the hunter, whose name means “old age” (jarā), also recalls 
Kṛṣṇa’s role as Time.  A similarly ambiguous situation is described by Arjuna in the 
Vana Parvan, who refers to Kṛṣṇa as both “the sacrifice and the one to be sacrificed to” as 
well as “the sacrifice” itself.158  In this way, a close theological reading of the 
Mahābhārata shows that in the world of the text, there is no clear dichotomy between the 
victim and the victor and indeed, such a dichotomy may be fundamentally impossible.  
The machinations of Time and Fate notwithstanding, such a reading does not destroy the 
possibility of human agency, but rather redefines it. 
 Once an abiding connection has been established between the otherworldly Kṛṣṇa 
and the other, more mundane characters of the Mahābhārata, it becomes possible to read 
Kṛṣṇa’s behavior within the epic as a model for human action.  As Hiltebeitel explains, 
when Gāndhārī sees her hundred sons slain on the battlefield, she charges Krishna 
with “overlooking” (upa-īkṣ-…) the destruction while being able to prevent 
it….Indeed, there is some irony in the charge that Krishna “overlooks” or “is 
indifferent to” the heroes’ fates.  One thinks of his advice to Arjuna to cultivate 
“indifference.”159 
 
                                                 
157 Once again, the analysis of Kṛṣṇa’s argument with Draupadī recalls her connection to him as Kṛṣṇā. 
158 Mbh 3.13.44-50. 
159 Hiltebeitel, The Ritual of Battle, 288. 
 41 
This shared terminology of “indifference” identified by Hiltebeitel is not insignificant, 
because it implies that Gāndhārī is not only correct in her assessment of Kṛṣṇa’s role in 
the war (on a superficial level, at least), but also that the slaying of her sons was actually 
the result of Arjuna engaging in an act of imitatio dei, because it was Arjuna’s 
“indifference” in the war that indirectly led to the death of the Kauravas.  For this reason, 
when Gāndhārī curses Kṛṣṇa to visit similar horrors upon his own people, the god merely 
smiles because he has already cultivated indifference to the extent that even the death of 
his people no longer matters to him.   
Aside from Kṛṣṇa’s momentary, murderous rage at the slaying of his son,160 
which could be seen as yet another example of the deluding powers of Time,161 Kṛṣṇa 
maintains a state of detachment throughout the entire epic.  Unlike other characters, 
Kṛṣṇa is not motivated primarily by the values of artha,162 kāma,163 dharma,164 or even 
mokṣa.165  Instead, he engages in worldly action with the constant understanding that it 
has absolutely no bearing on the ultimate reality and he does this without any undue 
sense of egoism.  In this way, Kṛṣṇa exemplifies the concept of vairāgya that Hudson 
identifies as the underlying emotion of the epic.   
                                                 
160 Mbh 16.4. 
161 See Mbh 2.72.5-15. 
162 Kṛṣṇa, it should be remembered, is also a prince, but somehow this fact never seems to cause him any 
anxiety in the text. 
163 The Ādi Parvan mentions that a group of apsarās became incarnate as Kṛṣṇa’s “sixteen thousand 
queens,” but again, he is never seen to obsess over them. See Mbh 1.61.90-95. 
164 In his capacity as a human, Kṛṣṇa never seems over-worried about upholding the dharma.  The question 
of kāladharman is another matter entirely, but one that is more or less divorced from Kṛṣṇa’s human 
attributes. 
165 He does meditate in preparation for his death at the hands of Jarā, but only at the proper time.  See Mbh 
16.5. 
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 The operative question then, is what this example accomplishes within the greater 
theodicean scheme of the epic.  Hudson maintains that in the absence of any conclusive 
philosophical discussion, the argument of the text is relegated to a “narrative strategy”166 
that manifests itself in a series of hints, implications, and suggestions, that must be then 
sifted out of the greater Mahābhārata.  Thus, when the sage Ugraśravas claims that the 
Strī Parvan167 was designed “to produce tears and terror in the minds of good people,”168 
this design is not merely an instance of artistic sadism, but rather a technique for instilling 
the audience with the kind of emotions that eventually lead to the state of vairāgya. 
As Hudson observes, the text accomplishes this through its portrayal of Time.  
Despite its myriad sub-stories and their diverse chronologies, the Mahābhārata declares 
time and time again that Time itself, much like suffering, can never be truly prevented, 
reversed, or even endured by humans in any ultimate sense, but it can be escaped in a 
psychological sense, because the sensation of detached equanimity that characterizes 
vairāgya allows one to move “beyond”169 all ordinary human experiences of suffering 
and Time.170  Just as Kṛṣṇa acts as both the personification of Time and also its victim, 
Time serves as both the “cause and a ‘solution’ to the problem of suffering,”171 because 
even as Time exploits the impermanence and vulnerability of all things, repeated 
exposure to the tragic ravages of Time—as one experiences in reading the 
                                                 
166 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 205-206. 
167 Coincidentally, the same book in which Gāndhārī has her argument with Kṛṣṇa. 
168 Mbh 1.2.195, quoted in Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 146. 
169 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 176. 
170 Such a state may or may not resemble a reader’s experience of the Mahābhārata.  See Hiltebeitel and 
Kloetzli, “Kāla,” 579. 
171 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 176. 
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Mahābhārata—has the ability to instill one with the same sense of constant fluctuation or 
“transitoriness,”172 which, once internalized, yields the state of vairāgya.   
Thus, as an all-powerful being unwilling or unable to stop the fundamental 
principle of Time, Kṛṣṇa could be seen as exempt from the value of rakṣaṇa dharma, 
because from a god’s-eye view merely protecting others from certain dangers simply 
delays the inevitable and perhaps even positions those people to experience even greater 
trauma in the future.  However, if Kṛṣṇa’s example does indeed communicate the value 
of vairāgya, then his words and actions within the greater epic can then be seen as the 
core framework of a living philosophy that promises to eliminate even the possibility of 
future suffering in the lives of its followers.  In any case, due to the aforementioned 
subtlety of the Mahābhārata’s narrative strategies and its reliance on suggestion, such 
tentative, optimistic speculation seems to be the closest thing to a coherent argument the 
text can support with respect to theodicy. 
Inconclusion: The Verdict 
 In this paper, I argued that the arguments against Kṛṣṇa put forth by Draupadī, 
Gāndhārī, and (to a lesser extent) Uttanka perform a crucial role in informing the 
“aesthetics of suffering” that characterize the Mahābhārata’s greater ethico-cosmic 
landscape.  Moreover, the significance of these arguments can be seen especially in 
reference to Kṛṣṇa’s identification with Time, and the gendered ethics and soteriological 
schemas implied by Draupadī and Gāndhārī’s status as women, wives, and queens.  In the 
end, I suggested a number of possible, if not entirely conclusive, ‘answers’ that could be 
                                                 
172 Ibid, 57. 
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given in response to these arguments, with special attention to the notion that on an 
ultimate, theological level, Kṛṣṇa as Time necessitates, exhibits, and encourages in 
various turns the value of vairāgya. 
However, any argument attempting to discover a deeper meaning in the 
Mahābhārata can only ever be a single reading that traces only a handful of threads in the 
greater tapestry of the text, because like dharma and like Kṛṣṇa himself, the prospect of 
discovering an abiding sense of meaning despite the myriad tragedies in the 
Mahābhārata is “hard to bear on the head” and “difficult to seize by force.”173  In the Ādi 
Parvan, Vaiśaṃpāyana praises the Mahābhārata, proclaiming that “whatever is here, on 
Law, on Profit, on Pleasure, and on Salvation, that is found elsewhere.  But what is not 
here is nowhere else,”174 but despite this glowing endorsement, the epic fails to answer 
even the most fundamental question in regard to the Law, namely: “Is dharma worth 
upholding if it can be maintained only at the cost of great suffering?”175 
In The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, Wendy Doniger cites Ursula Sharma 
in reference to “three levels of theodicy: cognitive (the problem of injustice), 
psychological (the need for comfort), and theological (the classical problem of 
monotheism).”176  While the epic arguments of the Mahābhārata certainly confronts all 
three levels,177 the results of these arguments remain far from conclusive in any universal 
                                                 
173 See Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s words in Mbh 5.128.39, quoted in Hiltebeitel, The Ritual of Battle, 123. 
174 Mbh 1.56.30-35. 
175 Greg Bailey, quoted in Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 218. 
176 Doniger, Origins of Evil, 15. 
177 As is demonstrated in the arguments with Kṛṣṇa, Time in the Mahābhārata can be seen equal parts 
cognitive and theological.  Of the three levels of theodicy, the psychological takes pride of place in the epic 
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sense.178  Doniger herself recognizes the difficulty of her subject when she quotes Paul 
Ricoeur’s assertion that “tragedy is unthinkable.”179  Likewise, in Disorienting Dharma, 
Hudson argues that when it comes to theodicy in the Mahābhārata, “fate, human 
exertion, karma, and Kṛṣṇa,”180 all represent ‘non-answers’ that fail to fully address the 
problem of evil in a comprehensive fashion.  In the end, Hudson comes to the rather 
bleak conclusion that “suffering is not a phenomenon that can be understood, or justified, 
or rationalized away; it simply exists.”181 
Like the disrobing of Draupadī, the problem of evil in the world represents a 
rupture of meaning that cannot be repaired through the usual methods of cognition, 
theology, and psychology.  This rupture carries a feeling of futility about it, as if anything 
short of the total surrender of vairāgya is—as Draupadī and Gāndhārī are fated to learn—
merely a foolhardy attempt to circumvent the relentless onrush of Time.  Perhaps the best 
advice to this effect comes from Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s chronically underappreciated minister 
Saṃjaya, who reminds the grieving king: 
Vidhātṛvihitaṃ mārgaṃ na kaś cid ativartate। 
kālamūlam idaṃ sarvaṃ bhāvābhāvau sukhāsukhe॥ 
kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharati prajāḥ। 
nirdahantaṃ prajāḥ kālaṃ kālaḥ śamayate punaḥ॥ 
kālo vikurute bhāvān sarvāṁl loke śubhāśubhān। 
kālaḥ saṃkṣipate sarvāḥ prajā visṛjate punaḥ। 
                                                                                                                                                 
because it is, in the end, a character-driven work.  However, if anything, the psychological level is satisfied 
even less than the other two. 
178 The abiding popularity of the epic, particularly the Gītā, implies that the supposedly inconclusive nature 
of the text’s theodicy is by no means a universal judgment common to all readers. 
179 Paul Ricoeur, quoted in Doniger, Origins of Evil, 373. 
180 Hudson, Disorienting Dharma, 205-206. 
181 Ibid, 214-215. 
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kālaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu caraty avidhṛtaḥ samaḥ॥ 
atītānāgatā bhāvā ye ca vartanti sāṃpratam। 
tān kālanirmitān buddhvā na saṃjñāṃ hātum arhasi॥ 
 
No one steps beyond the path the Ordainer has ordained.  All this is rooted in 
Time, to be or not to be, to be happy or not to be happy.  Time ripens the 
creatures.  Time rots them.  And Time again puts out the Time that burns down 
the creatures.  Time unfolds all beings in the world, holy and unholy.  Time 
shrinks them and expands them again.  Time walks in all creatures, unaverted, 
impartial.  Whatever beings there were in the past will be in the future, whatever 
are busy now, they are all the creatures of Time—know it, and do not lose your 
sense.182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
182 Mbh 1.1.187-190. 
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